Convergence and free-will by Stoica, Ovidiu Cristinel
CONVERGENCE AND FREE-WILL
CRISTI STOICA
Abstract. If our mind is just an algorithm running on a flesh hardware, then it
seems that there is no place for the free-will. An algorithm decides everything based
on deterministic computations, or on random inputs, but neither inevitability nor pure
hazard is free choice. Hopefully, some day, Science will be able to understand, monitor
and simulate all the mind processes. Even then, it will still be a possibility for the
free-will to exist, based on the convergence of the initial data. I propose a crucial
experiment to test this hypothesis.
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1. Is there a ghost in the machine?
The mind-body problem is of a fundamental importance for the human beings. We
all want, or need, to know more about ourselves. The mind and matter are very real
things, and cannot be dismissed that easily. It is no wonder that, at the beginning,
many philosophers considered that they both exist, and cannot be reduced one to the
other. In the same time, some thinkers, mostly in orient, proposed that there is only the
mind, and the material world is an illusion. Yet, Science evolved in such a manner that
provided a physical basis for more and more phenomena, which initially were though
to be irreducible to matter. This progress led today to such a wide mapping of the
phenomena related to mind, consciousness, thinking, feelings, that it seems that there is
only one percent remained unexplained, and it is only a matter of time that we will soon
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provide an explanation of all the mind phenomena. Thus, everything will be reduced to
materialist explanations. But, it would not be the first time scientists have the illusion
that little remained to be explained. For example, at the end of the XIX-th century,
it was believed that Physics is almost closed, then, in only several years, the Theory of
Relativity and Quantum Mechanics opened new realms, much wider than the classical
Physics.
Well, for some scientists may be clear that the missing “percent” in our explanations
about mind will be explained soon, as usual, by reducing it to physical phenomena.
Others may think that what remained unexplained is really important and irreducible.
For example, it is difficult to conceive how it will be provided an explanation of the
acute feeling we all have, that we really experience our lives, and we are not just a
software running on an organic hardware. And it is again difficult to admit that our
bodies just follow the laws of Physics, when we are so aware that in fact we are driving
them, obviously with a purpose.
This is why I think that we cannot draw yet a definitive conclusion in the mind-
body problem. I will not add many arguments for one viewpoint or another. Instead, I
will propose a localization of the problem, such that we can formulate it in a way that
emphasizes better a key aspect. Then, starting from this key problem, I will propose a
crucial experiment that may provide an objective resolution of the mind-body problem.
2. Minds in a physical world
The body related part of the problem involves inevitably the laws of Physics. We don’t
know yet everything about the physical universe in which we live. Our best theories,
General Relativity and The Standard Model of Particle Physics, can explain a large part
of the physical world, but still remains something unexplained. For example, we just
don’t know yet how to combine these two theories, despites of the progresses made in
String Theory and Quantum Gravity (which are very different than the theories they
try to unify). Even if we believe that only 1% remains unexplained, we can at most
hope that it will be dissolved in what we know so far. In fact, there are unexplained
things in Quantum Mechanics and Relativity too. Even when we will have a Theory of
Everything in Physics, corroborating what we know so far, there will always exist the
possibility to be contradicted by future experiments.
Although we don’t know which theory will win, and how our final explanation will
look like, we can make some general assumptions, which are respected by probably all
the theories proposed so far in Physics. As I described in [1], in most our theories
and attempts, the spacetime can be represented mathematically as a topological space
(including the discrete cases). The laws of Physics can be interpreted as imposing
constrains on the fields allowed on the spacetime. We can therefore identify the laws
with sections of a topological bundle over the spacetime. There are, of course, more than
one field, but can we always combine them with ease in a single field, by operations with
bundles. In order to distinguish the local laws of Physics from the global laws, we can
consider instead of the global sections of the bundle, a sheaf over the spacetime, with
the requirement that the solutions will always be global sections of that sheaf. I will not
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repeat here the details, they can be found in the cited article. I will only mention that,
even if we want to model theories that cannot, in principle, be represented as sheaves
over topological spaces, we can consider the spacetime to be a category, and the law
sheaf a contravariant functor on it. This is based on the fact that any topological space
can be viewed as a category.
The mathematical structure constructed in this way is named World. The analysis
presented there can make us an idea of what we can expect from our theories, indepen-
dent of which of them will be accepted as the description of our world. Even more, we
can see that the World Theory allows an inclusion of the emergent phenomena, as extra
conditions that simply refine the law sheaf. Metaphorically, some emergent phenomena
can be thought as software, running on the hardware formed by the matter fields.
But can we identify the mental processes with a software, implementable in terms of
laws of Physics? I don’t know. What I can say is that a lot of progresses are made,
in understanding the mind in terms of neurons and brain. Will, in time, the (more or
less) tiny part remained unexplained, be explained in terms of matter? I showed in [2]
that the Turing test [3] can easily be passed by an algorithm, but this may not be that
significant. The main challenge is to understand how is made that software/hardware
combination.
And now we come to the main problem. Let’s be optimistic and suppose that, some
day in the future, we will be able to monitor the brain activity, and to point precisely
how is constructed the mind, and how it works, as a software. The question many of
us have, is this: will that software really be a mind?. Our instincts may say that there
is no way that we are just such a software. Our experience, which accustomed us with
software able to do unimaginable task, saids that it may be. But is it? Our smart, or
genius, cell phone that we will use at that time, will cry to charge its batteries, but will
this mean that it really feels hunger?
3. The problem of free-will
3.1. What do we think we have, and a machine cannot have?
Although it is very possible to simulate a human mind in such a way that we can’t
distinguish the simulation from an original mind, will this mean that really there is no
difference?
An operationalist view will say that, because we can’t find any objective difference,
there is no one.
Some differences are suspected to exist. I believe that the more important that were
raised are the following ones:
Problem 1. Real human minds can have a strong feeling of free will.
Problem 2. I, as a human, have a very clear feeling that I exist, that I am a subject
experiencing the processes of my mind.
Somebody may object that I let aside the important issue of feelings, love, generosity
etc. This may be a point, but I will not discuss them here. I only want to say that a
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large range of feelings has been showed to be accompanied by brain processes that can
be monitored, and we can use these processes to make predictions about the feelings.
It is easy to believe that this part of the mind activity will be describable by a mind
software. What is more subtle is the feeling that we really are something having those
feelings, hence the problem 2. If we monitor a brain in all details, and see the processes
corresponding to a given feeling, is this a guarantee that there is somebody “in there”
really having the feelings?
I believe that the two problems are strongly related, but I will focus in this article on
the free-will problem.
3.2. The problem of free-will
The problem of free will (Problem 1) has been related to the problem of determinism.
Before the advent of Quantum Mechanics, the laws of Physics were deterministic. This
feature resides in their expression as partial differential equation (PDE ), subject to a set
of initial conditions. Knowing the initial conditions, the solution is uniquely determined.
Even areas of Physics which initially were considered to be subject of randomness, were
explained by statistics of systems made of large numbers of particles or molecules.
The determinism seemed for many to be a menace at the address of the free-will,
because, if everything is determined by some initial conditions in a very distant past, it
is too late for us to make any decision which is not predetermined.
Quantum Mechanics introduced a probability, which seemed irreducible to determinis-
tic laws. For physicists like Einstein[4], de Broglie, Bohm[5, 6, 7], Vigier, Schro¨dinger, to
accept this probabilistic character was an abdication from a fundamental principle of sci-
ence, the search for a more complete explanation. Bohr, Heisenberg, Born, on the other
hand, considered that these probabilities are irreducible. For many this was very attrac-
tive feature, since it is commonly believed that it allows, if not guarantees, the free-will.
There is a common belief that the determinism is incompatible with free-will[8, 9].
3.3. Is the free-will allowed by Quantum Mechanics?
J.S. Bell showed in [10] that the idea of pre-programming some possible hidden variables
to simulate the randomness of Quantum Mechanics can be tested experimentally. Such
experiments were carried out since then [11, 12, 13], confirming that there is no room
for pre-programming. This seemed to rule out any possibility for the deterministic view.
On the other hand, the idea of wave function collapse, which is the mechanism that in-
troduces the probabilities, has some ugly properties, suggesting that it would be desirable
to find a better explanation. Such explanations were provided during the time, but the
main problems remained. Even the Many Worlds interpretation [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19],
although claiming to solve this problem, it lets untouched the problems for the ac-
tual beings living in the actual worlds supposed to split [20, 21]. The decoherence
approach [22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] seems to be the solution for a part of the
quantum measurement problem and the emergence of classical from quantum, but there
is an important part still escaping.
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In a paper named “Smooth Quantum Mechanics ” [21], I showed a possible solution
to the apparent discontinuity occurring during the wave function collapse. Instead of
accepting that the Schro¨dinger equation is violated from time to time, by a discontin-
uous jump, I consider another explanation. There is a feature which is present even in
standard Quantum Mechanics, namely, what we choose to observe, affects in a strange
way the past![31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 20]. The delayed choice made by the observer par-
tially determines the solution of the Schro¨dinger equation, in an irreducible manner.
I use this feature, combined with the entanglement between the observed system and
the measurement device used for its preparation, to explain how is it possible that any
observation finds the system in an eigenstate, without the need of discontinuities in the
evolution. This can be done by allowing the initial conditions of the observed quantum
system plus the preparation device to be delayed. The delayed initial conditions mech-
anism shows that it is never too late to have a decision concerning the initial conditions
of the Universe (as long as they are not established yet). This mechanism reintroduces
the determinism in Quantum Mechanics, in a way that is simpler than in the standard
approach, avoiding the problems of the wave function collapse. This kind of determinism
is compatible with the free-will at the same extent as the indeterministic interpretation.
Whether or not this mechanism will be confirmed, Quantum Mechanics indeed can
allow the observer to make a choice. Either if this is done by discontinuities in the
evolution (which require a restatement of the initial conditions), or by the Smooth
Quantum Mechanics, the observer (that’s us) has a word to say about the evolution of
the quantum system. I will call this feature, in the deterministic or in the indeterministic
form, the quantum freedom. These two possibilities seem also to be the only ones allowed
by the World Theory. But, allowing the free-will, is not to say that it is guaranteed.
3.4. Is there enough room for the free-will in the brain processes?
3.4.1. Quantum mind
Various ways to use the quantum freedom in a quantum mind model were proposed by
various scientists, for example Henry Stapp [36, 37], Penrose and Hameroff [38, 39, 40,
41]. Tegmark [42, 43] showed by calculations that the decoherence happens too fast,
and the brain cannot make use of the quantum behavior, at least in Penrose’s theory.
The progresses in explaining how the brain works are mostly based on classical physics;
we don’t have any clue of quantum phenomena relevant to the brain functioning. This
seems to imply that there is no room for making use of the quantum freedom, or at
least the quantum phenomena will be insignificant for the mind processes. But is the
quantum mind the only way?
3.4.2. Can a computer algorithm have free-will?
Let’s first explore the following experiment. Suppose we create a software simulation
of the mind, and then we copy that software, and run it on two identical computers.
Then, suppose we input identical data, in order to test the reaction of that software. It’s
state will change, as a result of the interaction, perhaps it will also provide some output.
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Will the two copies evolve identically, under the same input data? If that software
implements a deterministic algorithm, it will evolve deterministic, hence identical on
the two computers. If the algorithm is indeterministic, there will be some randomness
present. That randomness is provided by the computer’s random generator, and it
depends on it. This is not a genuine free-will, because it is subject to the randomness
of the random generator of the computer, and not of a free choice. On the other hand,
what is a free choice? When an algorithm chooses something, it can do this either by a
computation, or by using the randomness, or a combination. But none of these is really
a free choice. Neither inevitability, nor pure hazard, is free choice.
If human mind is an algorithm, then the computer is the brain, or more generally, a
part of the physical world. If the physical laws allow random input, as it seems to result
from the quantum freedom, in both its versions, then this is like the random generator
of the computer. Would this mean that there is no possibility for the free-will? Is our
feeling that we can make a choice, nothing but an illusion of an algorithm, which in fact
is tied to deterministic computation combined with random input?
It seems that the only possibilities are deterministic computation and random choice,
and none of them can be identified with the free-will.
3.4.3. Can we draw a conclusion?
These two arguments suggest that there is no room for the free-will. But the mind-body
problem is much closed to us, as human beings, and it deserves more attention; we
cannot say too easy that we understand it well enough, and draw a quick conclusion.
Whether or not there is free-will, it is not yet clear. We don’t know yet everything
about quantum, or about mind. In the same way the 1% which it was believed to remain
uncovered by the science at the end of the XIX-th century exploded in few years into
the incredible worlds of quanta and relativity, we may expect big surprises.
As we shall see, it is too early to conclude.
4. The free-will test
4.1. Preconditions for the test
For the reasons exposed so far, I propose the following solution to the problem. First, we
have to be a little more patient, until we understand better the physical level, and the
way our minds work. I don’t mean to say that we should stop trying to find a solution,
by contrary. I recommend to work hardly in understanding better the matter and the
mind, but to refrain to draw any definitive conclusion in the free-will problem, until we
are able to make the following experiment, which can be crucial, and which depends on
our progresses in the areas mentioned above.
The state of art in Science, when we will be able to perform the experiment, will have
to fulfill the following conditions:
(1) We understand how the human brain works, in every detail.
(2) We know precisely how Physics explains all the details in the brain’s functioning.
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(3) We know how to relate each process taking place in the mind, with its correspon-
dent process in the brain.
(4) We are able to simulate by a software the human mind, not only to be able
to pass the Turing test, but also to contain simulations for each of the mind
processes.
Are these conditions too strong to be ever fulfilled? Assuming that they will be
sometime in the future realized, wouldn’t this mean that we know everything about
the human mind? Wouldn’t this mean that the mind is just a software running on our
brains, just a foam on the ocean of matter?
In understanding our minds, we will have to go on the scientific route. Currently, our
science searches for materialistic explanations of everything. Perhaps some day we will
construct a materialistic explanation for all phenomena, or, by contrary, we will need
to expand the Science, such that it contains other than the usual matter phenomena.
We don’t know yet. But, since currently a lot of scientists already try to realize the
conditions above, we have to advance together in this direction.
Assuming that the conditions above are fulfilled, many scientists will be satisfied
and consider that we know everything about the mind, which is apparently only a
manifestation of matter. Even if a human has the feeling that experiences something
more, we will say that this feeling is also contained in the explanation we have about
the brain’s functionality.
I will show that, when these conditions are realized, something more needs to be done.
There is still a possibility for our minds to be something more than just interacting
matter, and this possibility needs to be confirmed, or infirmed, by an experiment.
4.2. The “intention beyond matter” hypothesis
Assuming the conditions from §4.1 are fulfilled, we can say that the human mind works
like an algorithm. This algorithm can use some input, quantum for example, which
allows it to be an indeterministic algorithm. We may believe that this is the end, and
we are just algorithms.
What if the material mind is controlled from “outside”, by an immaterial intention?
For example, when a human plays a computer role-playing game, there is an algorithm
representing the character in the game. The algorithm may use some random input,
to act more unpredictable. But it is the human that also inputs data, and controls the
character’s actions. From the point of view of the algorithm, this looks like random
input, but if the player is good, we can observe that the actions seem to have a definite
intention. The inputs converge towards a purpose. Likewise, it is always possible that
the material mind is just a character in a role-playing game, and the real “I” of that
mind is something outside the material world. This immaterial “I” inputs, by using the
quantum freedom, data into the material world, to control the decisions of the algorithm
that we consider to be our minds.
This hypothesis has a big problem. It explains something from our world, by assuming
something outside the world, which is less plausible, or at least less understood. Hence,
we can consider that it does not help us too much.
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This is indeed true. But, if we really want to make sure that there is nothing more
about the mind, we will need to test this hypothesis. A skeptic will say that it is useless.
I want to say that we can make a test to accept/reject the intention beyond matter
hypothesis, and that it worth do it. It is important to do it, because it is an important
piece to understand our minds. If it fails, then the skeptics can say that they have the
proof. If, by any chance, succeeds, then there is no need to explain why it worth. In
both cases, the way we understand our minds will be changed.
4.3. The free-will test
Imagine the role-playing game software described above. Assume that there is a part
of that software, that have information about the behavior of a character of the game.
Based on that information, this part may be able to tell whether the input controlling
that character is purely random, or that it has a definite intention. What it need to do
is to calculate the average points that the character can obtain to the game, if the input
is random. Then, it calculates, based on the real score obtained by the character, how
special must be the input. If the score is higher, then the input is directed towards a
purpose.
When our knowledge will satisfy the conditions from §4.1, we will be able to tell
whether the seemingly random inputs in our minds reveal an intention. These inputs
are those provided by the quantum freedom (indeterministic or deterministic, depends
upon the theory). The inputs being not determined by the physical fields in the world,
we can say that they are from outside the world. They can be either random, or with an
intention. We will have to calculate how many of the possible random inputs look like
being with intention. We expect that this fraction is very tiny. Then, if by monitoring
a human brain in action, we observe that its actions attain purposes that, by random
inputs, are much less probable to be attained, we can conclude that it’s activity is
guided by an intention. And this intention is outside the physical world. If, on the other
hand, the inputs look really random, then we have no reason to admit another intention,
beyond the physical world.
The test consists in looking for improbable “coincidences” in the initial conditions of
the world, that “conspire” into leading us to make choices that reveal intention. I name
this type of phenomenon convergence of the initial conditions – it is like “God’s dices”
selecting the initial conditions are “loaded”.
If the test reveals that the world is affected, via initial conditions, in such a way,
we can conclude that we have a “component” which is irreducible to the physical laws,
but which affects their initial data. This influence has an atemporal, or trans-temporal
behavior, because it acts to initial conditions that are expected to be fixed long before
our choice.
If the result of the free-will test proposed here will be positive, we can conclude that
the answer to the problem 2 is that, indeed, beneath the brain processes that can be
monitored by physical means, there is something more. If the result is negative, we can
conclude that, if there is indeed a subject experiencing the phenomena, this subject must
be totally determined by the physical laws. From scientific point of view, we will not be
able to find differences between a human mind, and an artificial algorithm reproducing
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exactly the processes and behavior of a human mind. It will remain only a matter of
belief to consider that there exist an important difference, taking the form of a subject
experiencing the mind processes, between the human mind and the artificial mind.
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